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Recent Developments in Soviet Merchant Shipping

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
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August 1973

**Recent Developments
in Soviet Merchant Shipping**

By the end of 1972 the Soviet merchant fleet consisted of 1,500 ships totaling 12.7 million deadweight tons (DWT). Over the last two years, annual deliveries to the fleet approximated 500,000 DWT, about one-half the yearly additions envisioned in the 1971-75 five-year plan. One immediate consequence of this low level of deliveries was the failure of ton-mileage to grow in 1972 for the first time since 1948. Tonnage carried by the fleet, however, increased and was in line with plan targets.

Although of recent construction, the Soviet fleet is backward in modern marine technology. Ships are small by world standards, and the fleet lacks innovations found in Western fleets such as roll-on, roll-off vessels and LASH (lighter-aboard-ship) barge carriers. Similarly, progress in containerization lags; Soviet container ships are smaller and slower and remain noncompetitive with Western counterparts.

Important changes occurred in the pattern of fleet operations in 1972 and the first half of 1973. As a result of the signing of the Maritime Agreement with the United States in October 1972, large-scale Soviet shipping to US ports was possible for the first time since 1950. The Soviets extended three existing cargo lines and opened a new passenger line to US ports early in 1973. With the increase in calls at US ports, the USSR designated six US and Canadian companies as steamship agents.

As for non-US liner operations, the Soviet fleet closed a major gap in its worldwide network of liner services by adding Caribbean and Central American ports to an existing line between Europe and South America. The most significant development in Soviet tramp operations was the use of the tanker fleet in major new interport movements. For the first time other than in a back haul, the Soviet tanker fleet moved interport (cross trade) cargo for a major industrial power when it carried 275,000 metric tons of crude oil to Japan from Indonesia. This development suggests the capacity of tankers in the Soviet fleet evidently exceeds Soviet requirements for the carriage of its own oil cargoes.

The US-Soviet Maritime Agreement was a necessary condition for implementing the record sale of 19.8 million tons of US grain to the USSR negotiated in mid-1972. Soviet ships moved about 2.4 million tons of grain out of US ports in the period September 1972 - June 1973, or 16% of the total 15.7 million tons shipped in fiscal year 1973. Soviet carriage was less than one-half the amount authorized under the terms of the Agreement. The small reserve capacity of the fleet and the existence of prior commitments apparently precluded the allocation of additional Soviet tonnage to this task.

Note: Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome.

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DISCUSSION

Growth of Fleet in 1972

1. The merchant fleet of the USSR increased from 1,470 ships totaling 12.4 million deadweight tons (DWT) at year's end 1971 to 1,500 ships totaling 12.7 million DWT at year's end 1972 (see Table 1). Despite the goals of the 1971-75 five-year plan calling for annual deliveries of one million DWT, additions to the fleet during the first two years of the plan have averaged only 500,000 DWT. This level is less than two-thirds of average yearly deliveries in 1967-70. Although the Soviet fleet ranks as the seventh largest in the world, a position it has held since 1964, it accounts for only slightly more than 3% of world tonnage, as shown in the following tabulation:

	Million Deadweight Tons as of 31 Dec 1972	Percent of World Total
Total	399.5	100.0
Liberia	83.2	20.8
Japan	52.3	13.1
United Kingdom	43.5	10.9
Norway	38.2	9.6
Greece	25.9	6.5
United States		
(active)	13.8	3.5
USSR	12.7	3.2
Other	129.9	32.4

2. With two-thirds of its inventory less than 10 years old, the Soviet fleet is young by world standards. Yet in technology and size of ships, the fleet lags well behind the fleets of major non-Communist maritime states. Whereas other countries operate tankers as large as 477,000 DWT and bulk dry cargo ships as large as 165,000 DWT, the biggest tanker in the Soviet fleet is 50,000 DWT and its largest bulk carrier a mere 32,000 DWT. Moreover, the largest full container ship in the Soviet fleet at the end of 1972 was a 4,700-DWT vessel with a speed of 15 knots and a capacity for 218 containers -- hardly competitive with Western container ships with speeds of 25 to 33 knots and space for as many as 3,000 containers. Two other recent innovations introduced in Western fleets, the "Ro-Ro" (roll-on, roll-off) horizontal-loading vehicle carriers and the LASH (lighter-aboard-ship) barge carriers, have no counterparts in the Soviet fleet.

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Table 1

USSR: Growth of the Merchant Fleet

	Inventory as of 31 Dec		Net Increase in Tonnage Over Previous Year		Deliveries During Year
	Number	Million Dead- weight Tons	Million Dead- weight Tons	Percent ¹	Million Dead- weight Tons
1959	590	3.3	0.3	6	0.4
1960	650	3.9	0.6	18	0.6
1961	680	4.2	0.3	8	0.4
1962	740	4.8	0.6	14	0.7
1963	820	5.7	0.9	19	0.9
1964	900	6.9	1.2	21	1.3
1965	990	8.0	1.1	16	1.2
1966	1,070	8.9	0.9	12	1.0
1967	1,150	9.7	0.8	9	0.8
1968	1,230	10.4	0.7	8	0.8
1969	1,320	11.2	0.8	7	0.8
1970	1,400	11.9	0.7	7	0.8
1971	1,470	12.4	0.5	4	0.5
1972	1,500	12.7	0.3	2	0.5

1. Derived from unrounded data.

3. The lull in deliveries to the Soviet fleet is attributable in part to (a) the recognition of a limited need for additional vessels of the sizes and types already in the fleet, and (b) the inability of larger tankers and bulk carriers to enter Soviet ports until programs for deepening the ports are completed. Work on deepening certain Black Sea and Far East ports is under way and should be completed in the next two years or so.¹ As a result of this dilemma, deliveries of tankers, which averaged more than 200,000 DWT a year during 1966-70, dropped to only 65,000 DWT in 1972, with no ship larger than 16,000 DWT. Deliveries of dry cargo ships dropped less precipitously. The 400,000 DWT added to the fleet in 1972 was two-thirds of the 1966-70 average. New classes introduced in 1972 included the first dry cargo vessel in the fleet of more than 23,000 DWT

1. The first units of the two classes of ships that will require these deepwater facilities, the Soviet-built 150,000-DWT Krym-class tankers and 105,000-DWT combination oil and dry bulk carriers built in Poland, will probably not be delivered until 1974 at the earliest.

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(the Mikha Tskhakaya, a 32,000-DWT bulk carrier); the first class of full container ships of more than 1,100 DWT (Sestroretsk, 4,700 DWT); and three classes of conventional dry cargo ships with design features permitting their use as part container ships (Varnemyunde, 12,050 DWT; Sosnogorsk, 12,900 DWT; and Leninskaya Gvardiya, 7,500 DWT).

4. In the first half of 1973, Moscow continued its cautious approach to containerization and maintained its preference for ships capable of carrying either conventional or containerized liner cargo. Of the seven new classes of dry cargo ships introduced through June 1973, only one, the Aleksandr' Fadeyev, is listed as a full container ship, and its container capacity is low for a vessel of its DWT. The characteristics of all seven classes are given in the tabulation below:

Class	Type	Builder	DWT	Container Capacity	Knots
Aleksandr' Fadeyev	Container	USSR	10,200	358	17.0
Geroi Panfilovtsy	General-purpose dry cargo	USSR	13,500	342	17.3
Nikolay Zhukov	General-purpose dry cargo	USSR	6,500	229	16.4
Pioner Moskvyy	Packaged timber carrier	USSR	5,300	204	15.4
Rostok	General-purpose dry cargo	East Germany	5,800	125	16.0
Nikolay Novikov	Packaged timber carrier	Poland	14,000	298	15.0
Igor' Grabar'	Packaged timber carrier	Finland	3,300	Unknown	14.0

5. The slowdown in deliveries of ships affected fleet performance in 1972, when ton-mileage failed to increase for the first time since 1948. Cargo turnover in 1972 amounted to 377 billion ton-miles, about the same as in 1971. Fulfillment of the plan goal of 496 billion ton-miles by 1975 is now in jeopardy. Growth of total tonnage carried by the fleet was more on target, an increase of 4% to 178 million tons in 1972. The average annual growth rate needed to meet the 205 million tons targeted for the end of the plan period is 5%.

Maritime Relations with the United States

6. Record grain purchases by the USSR in 1972 and the signing of a US-Soviet Maritime Agreement effective 22 November² have great

2. Although the Agreement was signed on 14 October, it did not become effective until 22 November, when a formula was worked out for charter rates to be paid to US ships by the USSR for carrying grain.

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bearing on present and future operations of the fleet. The grain sales would not have been possible without assurance from the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) that its members would cooperate in loading grain for the USSR on ships of all flags in Great Lakes, East Coast, and Gulf ports.³ The ILA commitment stemmed in turn from the stipulation in the Maritime Agreement that the US and Soviet ships would each have the opportunity to carry at least one-third of US-Soviet seaborne trade.

7. Other benefits accrued to the USSR from the Maritime Agreement. With the threat of an ILA boycott lifted, Soviet tramps and liners were able to enter US Great Lakes, East Coast, and Gulf ports for the first time since 1950 to participate in the movements of cargoes in US trade with both the USSR and third countries. This use of Soviet ships avoids expenditure of hard currency for the movement of Soviet cargo and earns hard currency through the movement of cargoes for foreign shippers. At 40 of the most important US ports, Soviet ships now enter routinely after giving four days' advance notice. Under previous US port security regulations, visits were allowed only with permission after a two-week advance request to enter. Calls at most other US ports still take place under this two-week advance request procedure.

8. Movement of grain, which involves bulk cargoes and ships operating on a tramp basis, has dominated Soviet shipping activity in the US trade since the Maritime Agreement came into effect. Nonetheless, officials of the Soviet Maritime Fleet also have been expanding their liner services to US ports and soliciting non-grain cargoes for carriage by Soviet tramp vessels to and from the United States.

Soviet-US Liner Services

9. Aside from the introduction of container carriage on additional existing conventional lines, the major thrust in Soviet liner operations since 1971 has been the extension of service to US ports opened as a result of the Maritime Agreement. When the Agreement came into effect, Soviet liner service to the United States consisted of only a single line operated by the Far East Steamship Company (FESCO) of Vladivostok between Japan and West Coast ports in the United States and Canada. This service functioned only between Japan and Canada until 1969, when calls at US ports were added on an experimental basis. Currently, the line offers more sailings to US ports - including Seattle, Portland, Oakland, and Long Beach - than to Canadian ports. In September 1972, container service was added on the route through use of conventional Pula-class cargo liners


3. This problem has never existed on the West Coast where another longshoremen's union has jurisdiction.

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modified to carry containers on deck. In May 1973, the Aleksandr' Fadeyev, the largest full container ship in the fleet, was assigned to the line (see the photograph).

**The Soviet Full Containership Aleksandr' Fadeyev
at the Port of Long Beach**



The USSR's first full containership in trans-Pacific service continues to show its colors on the US West Coast. The 10,200-DWT Aleksandr' Fadeyev of the Far Eastern Shipping Co. is shown here on its latest call in California, at Pacific Container Terminal in the Port of Long Beach. It recently was photographed while making its maiden approach to the Port of Oakland. At Long Beach the vessel discharged a cargo of electronics, textiles, and general merchandise from Hong Kong, Kobe, and Tokyo and lifted a shipment of cotton, nonferrous metals, and machinery for the Far East. The ship is the first of three scheduled for the West Coast-Far East trade.

10. By the end of June 1973, the USSR had added US ports to three other existing lines. One of these lines provides eastbound sailings only, from the Gulf ports of Houston and New Orleans to West European ports in the Antwerp/Hamburg range and Leningrad. This service, which began operating on a monthly basis in February 1973, is part of the Baltic Steamship Company's Baltic/Western Europe - West Coast of South America/Caribbean service. The other two lines that added US ports of call were the Murmansk Arctic Steamship Company's Baltic/Western Europe - Eastern Canada/Great Lakes line and the Black Sea Steamship Company's Black Sea/Mediterranean - Eastern Canada/Great Lakes line. Both added US Great Lakes ports (Chicago and Milwaukee) to the itineraries of ships that formerly called only at Canadian Great Lakes ports. Calls at US ports began in April immediately after the opening of the shipping

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season on the St. Lawrence Seaway. The Baltic service uses only conventional cargo liners; the Black Sea/Mediterranean service used only conventional vessels until the current Seaway season, when one Sestoretz-class container ship was assigned to the line.

11. The USSR's Baltic Steamship Company apparently plans to open a new line on the Baltic/Western Europe - East Coast of the United States route during the second half of 1973. In June the *Journal of Commerce* carried advertisements alerting shippers to the forthcoming announcement of a twice-monthly service between US ports north of Cape Hatteras and West European ports in the Antwerp/Hamburg range and Leningrad. Ships assigned to the route will be conventional cargo liners adapted to carry containers on deck. US ports of call will be New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.

12. In June 1973 the Baltic Steamship Company inaugurated the USSR's only passenger line to the United States, a project Soviet shipping officials have been pushing since 1964. The line offers sailings between Leningrad and New York via London, Bremerhaven, and Le Havre.

13. In view of burgeoning maritime relations with the United States, the USSR has designated a number of US firms as its agents. These firms include Texas Transport and Terminal Co., Inc. of Houston, which serves as agent and stevedore representative for all Soviet-owned and chartered shipping in Gulf and East Coast ports; Nordship, Inc. of Chicago, which handles Soviet shipping in Great Lakes ports; and two firms on the West Coast, Interocean Steamship Corporation of San Francisco, which takes care of Soviet ships in Oakland and Long Beach, and International Freightliners, Ltd., which covers Seattle and Portland. International Freightliners, a subsidiary of a Canadian firm of the same name located in Vancouver, B.C., reportedly is controlled by Sovinflat, the organization in the Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet responsible for overseas representation.

Growth in Other Liner Services

14. The USSR added only two completely new international cargo lines to its network from the end of 1971 to 30 June 1973. On that date, it was operating 42 scheduled lines. Of these, 28 are on routes where most cargoes are in Soviet trade and 14 are in the cross trades where most cargoes move between non-Soviet ports (see Table 2). Only four of the lines function in the conference system.

15. One of the new services is a container feeder line for the Trans-Siberian Landbridge (similar to that opened in 1971 between Nakhodka and Japan) on the Vladivostok/Nakhodka - Hong Kong route

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Table 2

USSR: International Cargo Lines
as of 30 June 1973

Lines Operated Unilaterally by Soviet Steamship Companies

Company	Route
Murmansk Arctic	Soviet Baltic/Western Europe - Eastern Canada/Great Lakes ¹
Baltic	Soviet Baltic/Western Europe - Australia ² , ³
Baltic	Soviet Baltic/Western Europe - New Zealand ²
Baltic	Soviet Baltic/Western Europe - Caribbean and West Coast of South America ¹
Baltic	Soviet Baltic - Netherlands, Belgium, and West Germany ³
Baltic	Soviet Baltic - East Coast United Kingdom (Hull) ³
Baltic	Soviet Baltic - Sweden - Italy - Egypt ¹
Estonian	Soviet Baltic - Sweden (East Coast)
Estonian	Soviet Baltic - Norway and Denmark
Lithuanian	Soviet Baltic - West Germany
Danube	Soviet Danube - Near East (Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Cyprus)
Danube	Soviet Danube - Turkey
Danube	Soviet Danube - North Africa
Danube	Soviet Danube - Greece
Black Sea	Soviet Black Sea - Persian Gulf (Iraq)
Black Sea	Soviet Black Sea - North Vietnam
Black Sea	Southeast Asia - Western Europe/Soviet Black Sea ¹
Black Sea	Soviet Black Sea/Mediterranean Europe - Eastern Canada/Great Lakes ² , ³
Black Sea	Soviet Black Sea - East Africa/Red Sea
Black Sea	Soviet Black Sea - Southern France
Azov	Soviet Black Sea - Turkey/Greece
Azov	Soviet Black Sea - Italy ³
Azov	Soviet Black Sea - Near East
Azov	Soviet Black Sea - Algeria
Caspian	Iran (Caspian) - Baltic - North Sea (via Volga - Baltic Waterway) ¹
Far East	Soviet Far East/Japan - Western Canada and the United States ¹ , ³
Far East	Soviet Far East/Japan - Southeast Asia/India ¹
Far East	Soviet Far East/Hong Kong ¹ , ³
Far East	Soviet Far East/Japan ¹ , ³

Lines Operated Jointly by Soviet and Foreign Steamship Companies

Company	Route	Nationality of Foreign Partners
Baltic	Soviet Baltic - East Coast United Kingdom (London) ³	British
Baltic	Soviet Baltic/Western Europe - East Coast of South America (Baltamerica) ²	Polish and East German
Estonian	Soviet Baltic - West Germany	West German
Estonian	Baltic/Western Europe - West Africa (Uniafrica) ¹	Polish and East German
Latvian	Soviet Baltic - West Coast United Kingdom ³	British
Latvian	Soviet Baltic - East Germany ³	East German
Latvian	Soviet Baltic - France (Atlantic)	French
Latvian	Soviet Baltic - Netherlands ³	Dutch
Latvian	Soviet Baltic - Belgium ³	Belgian
Black Sea	Soviet Black Sea - Bulgaria ³	Bulgarian
Black Sea	Soviet Black Sea - Egypt ³	Egyptian
Black Sea	Soviet Black Sea - India/Sri Lanka	Indian
Far East	Soviet Far East - Japan	Japanese

1. An independent line operating largely or entirely in the cross (or transit) trades.
2. A conference line operating largely or entirely in the cross trades.
3. Line offering full or partial container service.

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that started in July 1972. The other is a Baltic Steamship Company service linking Soviet and Swedish ports on the Baltic with Italian and Egyptian ports on the Mediterranean initiated at the beginning of 1973.

16. In addition to the new services, the Baltpacific service, which was opened by the Baltic Steamship Company in August 1971 on the Soviet Baltic/Western Europe - West Coast of South America route, was expanded. At the end of 1972 this service added calls in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, and Honduras, thus closing one of the few remaining gaps in the USSR's worldwide network of cargo lines. During the first quarter of 1973, Baltpacific extended its operations to include US and Mexican ports on the Gulf of Mexico. The final important change in the network of Soviet cargo lines occurred when the Estonian Steamship Company's unilateral Baltic/Western Europe - West Africa service and a similar joint East German/Polish service (the Uniafrica Line) were combined early in 1972.

17. Soviet progress in the seaborne container era has focused entirely on cargo liner operations. By 30 June 1973, 15 Soviet lines were in container carriage, compared with 11 at the end of 1971. The new Vladivostok/Nakhodka - Hong Kong line opened as a container service, and container-carrying ships were assigned to three existing routes: Soviet Far East/Japan - West Coast of Canada and the United States (September 1972), Soviet Baltic/Western Europe - Australia (February 1973), and Black Sea/Mediterranean - Eastern Canada/Great Lakes (April 1973). In spite of the growth in the number of containerized services, the USSR remains in the backwater of containerized seaborne transport. As indicated earlier, container-carrying vessels being added to the Soviet fleet are much smaller and slower than their Western counterparts. No change will occur until the 23-knot, 13,000-DWT East German-built Mercur-class full container ships enter the fleet in 1974. The large (20,000 DWT) Soviet-built gas turbine Atlantika-class full container ship is reported to have been on the drawing boards in 1972; the current status of this project is not known.

Growth in Tramp Operations

18. Through the end of 1972, tramp operations of the Soviet fleet were influenced only slightly by the Maritime Agreement and the grain sales. With few exceptions, all the tramp activity in US-Soviet trade involved movements of grain. Soviet vessels apparently did not handle any foreign interport (cross trade) cargo between US and third country ports, although future large-scale Soviet participation in such voyages may be expected. Such carriage, however, will occur infrequently as long as the United States remains a major supplier of grain to the USSR and priority is given to the movement of this cargo. A few cross trade voyages occurred in the

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first half of 1973, and the USSR apparently has been negotiating to bring Swedish iron ore pellets to the US East Coast using vessels on the back haul after delivering grain to the Baltic.

19. Among the notable developments in Soviet tramp operations outside of US-Soviet trade in 1972 was the appearance of major new foreign interport movements by the Soviet tanker fleet. The largest of these involved carriage of crude oil from nationalized fields in Iraq to Bulgaria (600,000 tons), East Germany (432,000 tons), Sri Lanka (234,000 tons), and other destinations. Similarly, Soviet tankers carried about 275,000 tons of crude oil from Indonesia to Japan. This arrangement with Japanese shippers is important because it did not involve shipments on Soviet account (in contradistinction to most of the Iraqi crude oil). Moreover, for the first time, Soviet tankers were observed moving interport cargo for an advanced industrial country other than in a back haul. This development suggests that the supply of tankers of the sizes already in the Soviet fleet has finally exceeded the USSR's need for such vessels in the carriage of its own oil cargoes.

The Movement of US Grain to the USSR in Fiscal Year 1973

20. As of 1 July 1972, 470,000 tons of US corn, barley, and oats remained to be shipped to the USSR under US commitments for fiscal year (FY) 1972, which totaled 3.3 million tons. All such cargoes moving prior to 1 July 1972 and all grain shipped under these and subsequent commitments were handled by third-flag ships through August 1972. US ships were not in the trade, because their high operating costs made them noncompetitive in the world charter market. Soviet ships were out of the trade because of the threat of an ILA boycott at ports east of the Rockies and because of the high cost of loading feed grains on the West Coast for delivery to Black Sea and Baltic ports.

21. Record grain sales of about 19.8 million tons in FY 1973 raised the quantity of grain to be moved by 30 June 1973 to more than 20.2 million tons. A breakdown of the commodity composition of this tonnage is as follows:

	Thousand Tons						
	Total	Wheat	Corn	Barley	Oats	Rye	Soybeans
Spillover from FY 1972	470	0	220	200	50	0	0
Commitments in FY 1973	19,760	11,000	7,200	20	0	380	1,160
Total to be moved FY 1973	20,230	11,000	7,420	220	50	380	1,160

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22. Even after conclusion of the major sales contracts for wheat and corn in July and early August 1972, the pace of shipments lagged. Soviet ships entered the trade in September when cargoes of wheat (a grain acceptable at Soviet ports on the Pacific) first became available at West Coast ports in the Portland, Oregon, area. For the next two months, Soviet loading activity was confined to these ports. Additional commitments for third-flag ships were likewise inhibited because of the likelihood that provisions in the forthcoming Maritime Agreement allotting cargo in US-Soviet trade among US, Soviet, and third-flag ships would be retroactive to 1 July 1972. In this maze of uncertainty, the volume of shipments dropped off steadily from 1.1 million tons in August to less than 800,000 tons in November (see Table 3).

Table 3
Shipments of US Grain to the USSR, by Carrier¹

	Thousand Metric Tons			
	Carrier			
	Total	Third Flag	USSR	US
Total Jul 1972-				
Jun 1973	15,714	10,928	2,443	2,343
1972	5,598	4,854	517	227
Jul	327	327
Aug	1,111	1,111
Sep	1,059	992	67
Oct	870	811	59
Nov	770	732	38
Dec	1,462	882	352	227
1973	10,116	6,074	1,926	2,116
Jan	1,367	768	446	152
Feb	1,363	803	374	186
Mar	1,488	726	461	301
Apr	1,609	896	308	405
May	2,067	1,415	256	396
Jun	2,222	1,466	81	675

1. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

23. Conditions changed rapidly once the Agreement went into effect on 22 November. Soviet ships entered US Gulf and East Coast ports for the first time, and US-flag ships made their initial appearance in the trade. Shipments in December rose to almost 1.5 million tons, double the November total, with Soviet ships handling 350,000 tons.

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24. Soviet participation in the grain trade reached a peak of 460,000 tons in March 1973. A sustained movement at this rate would have required 900,000 DWT of shipping, or 7% of Soviet fleet capacity available at the end of 1972. The USSR was either unwilling or unable to divert this amount of tonnage despite the fact that the use of non-Soviet ships on the booming world charter market would incur even higher expenditures of hard currency. Soviet carriage of grain dropped each month after March and by June was down to only 80,000 tons. Seasonal factors such as the resumption of timber exports from ports in the Soviet North, the mobilization of shipping for the annual movement of supplies to points along the Northern Sea Route, and the resumption of shipments of Canadian grain from St. Lawrence and Hudson's Bay ports may explain part of this falloff. The drop also mirrored the limited reserve capacity in the Soviet fleet.

25. By June 1973, all but 4.5 million tons of the more than 20.2 million tons in US grain export commitments to the USSR were shipped, as shown in the tabulation below. Only 2 million tons of this shortfall was unexpected. Soviet representatives in late 1972 agreed to deferred shipment of 2.5 million tons of corn until FY 1974, when it had become clear that this tonnage could not be moved earlier because of rail and port congestion.

	Million Tons						
	Total ¹	Wheat	Corn	Barley	Oats	Rye	Soybeans
Total to be moved in FY 1973	20.2	11.0	7.4	0.2	Negl.	0.4	1.2
Total actually moved in FY 1973	15.7	10.4	3.6	0.2	Negl.	0.2	1.2
Spillover into FY 1974	4.5	0.6	3.8	0	0	0.2	0

1. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

26. Of the 15.7 million tons moved in FY 1973, 2.4 million tons were on Soviet ships, 2.3 million tons were on US ships, and a staggering 10.9 million tons were on third-flag ships (see Table 3). For the entire period, the Soviet and US fleets carried about 16% and 15%,⁴ respectively. Their shares increased to about 20% if the effective date of the Maritime Agreement is used as the benchmark. In any case, carriage by both fleets fell far short of the percentage shares provided for in the Agreement.

4. US carriage certainly would have been greater if a number of ships earmarked for the grain movement to the USSR had not accepted more lucrative charter offers in other trades during the period of uncertainty before the Agreement came into effect.